Killing the Command Sergeant Major

Recipe to add pay, presige and authority for senior enlisted leaders

Command Sgt. Maj. Kepner assumes duties as 11th sergeant major of the Army Guard. By Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy National Guard Bureau, Guard News, The National Guard. June 10, 2016

In 1958, after years of rank compression, most prominently in the enlisted cohorts, the Department of Defense expanded the pay tables and added two enlisted ranks at grade E-8 and E-9. While enlisted soldiers rejoiced the news early decisions were to assign those grades to positions to tables of organization that were viewed as the “tough jobs,” the first sergeant and the regimental sergeants major of a color bearing unit. Many senior enlisted soldiers in those jobs at the time were the grizzled veterans of World War II and Korea, and soon those leaders who were already serving in those positions on the line began to get promoted to these new ranks, earning the benefit of higher pay for their service.

Previously, the top three graders were the center of gravity for the enlisted cohort of the time, with an E-7 either being a platoon sergeant or a first (or master) sergeant, depending on their duty position. Each regiment also had the duty position of sergeant major, which eventually became the rank title for the pay grade E-9. When the grade changes came about there were others in the E-7 pay grade who had shied away from tough jobs who were serving on staffs, in nontraditional field roles, or buried in an office of general officer led command, who now wanted a chance at getting promoted without putting in the time.

Bloated Ranks

The enlisted ranks were also filled with RIF’d officers and battlefield commissioned mustangs who reverted back to enlisted statsus, often riding out their time to retire at the highest grade. Besides compression, their was bloat, and the enlisted cohort was a dumping grounds for types of compassioned reasons. The promotion system was decentralized and managed by the unit; so, one couldn’t get promoted unless there was a vacant position. By all accounts, the “stripes” were owned and managed by the unit, which caused enlisted soldiers to have to jockey for assignments to allow them upward mobility and promotion. And for the good ol’ boy system to hook a brother up.

What arose was a proliferation of E-8 and E-9 positions, and over time some ended up serving in E-9 sergeant major positions mostly doing administrative tasks at general-officer and flag level (what we call nominative positions today). Many at the time were believed to be living on easy street, while their counterparts we serving as sergeants major in regiments, then later battalions and brigades, slogging it out on the line. After complaints rose to the top, Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson directed sergeant major William O. Wooldridge, who had only two years earlier been selected as the first ever sergeant major of the Army, to form a group to study the problem. The result of that was that the Army created a new rank and position of Command Sergeant Major to better identify the sergeant major of a command.

Wooldridge would later say they did not conduct any serious study of the problem, and he never experienced that confusion himself firsthand. He said, when he was a unit sergeant major in the field, everyone knew who he was, and they knew who the S-3 sergeant major was. During their short study he and his ad hoc committee’s belief was CSMs should only be at the battalion and brigade, and not at the division or higher. However, it was positions at the division, corps and beyond was where the misidentification troubles laid, the original gripe came from the U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM). And so, after their recommendations went to the Chief, the action was handed off to the Army G-1 for implementation, and Wooldridge would go on to say “they did it all wrong.” OPO had conducted a study a year earlier in 1967 “to improve the caliber and effectiveness of sergeants major coccupying traditional command sergeants major positions.” They estblished a CSM Program and the new rank proliferated. The senior NCO of every flag bearing unit, which in 1968 was estimated to be between 1500 positions, were coded as CSM and 192 of those men (and one woman) who served in the top tier flag positions were the first appointed as command sergeants major.

Long Live the Sergeant Major

Using Wooldridge as a judge of a program is risky as he had dark secrets which would later be uncovered, but some 35-years later he still believed the NCO corps lost control of the program because “it immediately went to personnel” (Office of Personnel Management at the Pentagon), and that we had “done it to ourselves by not standing firm and being counted when the program was announced.” And now for over 50-years some in the Army have a love-hate relationship with the position of command sergeant major, most especially above the battalion or brigade level. So much so, in my opinion we have created this vision of the CSM as an enigma, resulting in people coming down with something I call CSM derangement syndrome. With that said, after years of study and research, I feel for too many unspoken reasons and for NCOs not standing up for ourselves still, we need to get back to the original root of the problem and fix what Wooldridge’s small committee could not do. And to do that we must kill the rank and title of Command Sergeant Major and return to the rightful title of address and position of the most senior enlisted leader of the battalion and brigade the original rank of sergeant major, and for it not to be used for positions above the O-6 level.

The Army has a need for enlisted leaders in key roles above the brigade, whether advising commanders or serving in a technical role on a staff. However roles, responsibility, and authority of each of them specifically is where the OPO punted in 1968. The Army did not define a clear role for the CSM, and for many that remains a mystery that is akin to conspiracy. Some get hung up on the changing role of the CSM, while others confuse the words command and authority when it comes to the CSM duites and roles, especially when it comes down to enforcement. To tell the truth, it was probably the best option that could have been done to provide upward mobility to the enlisted ranks, and to offer prestige. But in today’s environment the Army can reap a return on the significant investment in professional education for the enlisted cohort. The sergeant major of today is much different than when the CSM program was first envisioned. Wooldridge would say about the enlisted leaders of his era, “We promoted people who weren't qualified to fill the position that was so-called command slot.” In my view today we have a more stringent selection process as compared to the original, and we can endure an overhaul.

I don’t suggest we tear apart our rank structure just for the sake of some people getting butthurt about a word, but we have real problems that we continue to suck up. There are other dirty secrets when it comes to senior enlisted stature because we still are not standing up for ourselves as a profession. The role and authority of the sergeant major of the command is not well defined, and changes at the will of the commander. The most highly trained and educated enlisted members of the U.S. Army are on a leash that is only defined by their current commander, which grows and shrinks at any time. Though there is a defined NCO support channel with mumbo jumbo chain language, the fact remains senior enlisted leaders have no real authority, are not in command, and do not make policy, even when it affects them most.

Today a CSM serving at the command, or nominative, level notionally progressed from battalion to brigade, and to the division or command, all without monetary gain. While the officer cohort that moves through those positions progress to higher pay grades and monetary increases that are long lasting into retirement, instead the E-9s are awarded “hush money” by way of pro pay per “star” level of their boss. As the CSM  progresses their short-term pay is higher, but compare the retirement pay of a Corps Commander and the Corps Command Sergeant Major. Not that they should be equal, but the Corps CSM pay is the same as that of a purely technical staff sergeant major with equal years of service, but often with less time on the line, and without the responsibility and culpability.

Warranted Sergeants Major

The way we should advance enlisted leaders beyond brigade is to warrant them, just as the Army does with a warrant officer one (WO1). Service secretaries have the authority to warrant technical experts, which the command sergeant of today is. At the top of their branch, we need Warranted Sergeants Major (WSM) to serve at command level, and provide them roles, responsibility, and legal authority to perform advanced duties commensurate with Army requirements. And allow them the authority to create policy and allocate resources. The way they could be assessed into such a program is that once a Brigade-level sergeant major is selected to serve at division (or equivalent) and higher they receive a warrant and transition from the enlisted pay table to the warrant and begin at WO3 level. Chief warrant officers are warranted in the name of the President; however, I suggest the WSM remain with the service secretary throughout.

The sergeant major rank and wreath can remain to serve as the identifier for a warranted sergeant major, and the pay is not only commensurate with their duties and responsibility, but it will finally carry over to retirement. The band for the first level of WO3 is for 1- and 2-star level WSMs. Should one be selected for the next band, 3-or-4-star level, they are increased to pay WO4. And if they are skilled enough to be selected as the Sergeant Major of the Army, SEAC, SEL of the Guard, or a host of other current or future service level positions, they would retain their current rank insignia and titles, but be advanced to the pay band of WO5. All of this can be done at the service level and does not require changes to DoD pay tables.

According to the Department of Defense, “Warrant officers hold warrants from their service secretary and are specialists and experts in certain military technologies or capabilities.” This can define the WSM, and not only expand the pay, but the prestige of the senior enlisted cohort. It also allows Army leaders to more clearly define roles, responsibility, and bestow authority on senior enlisted leaders. But what about the E-9 specialists, how are they to be addressed and identified? I suggest a  return to the original rank insignia decisions after the 1958 military pay bill was enacted, it is time to reintroduce the Specialist 9 rank insignia and retitle the position as staff sergeant major. This term was one of the original titles of address for the E-9 enlisted member on a staff who was not the senior NCO of a color bearing unit, and should have stuck instead of creating a whole new rank and title.

Staff Sergeant Major (Specialist 9)

The Specialist 8 and 9 ranks were created, but never used as the opinion was that NCOs above E-7 have a leadership role and must wear sergeants’ stripes. Today the staff sergeant major may supervise a small team of fellow staff NCOs, the fact of the matter is they are mostly technicians who work in a specialty position indirectly related to leadership, and more of one as a manager. The Army uses the term management 44 times in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, but manager only oncee. We need to get over ourselves and realize that not every enlisted member is a leader, and that the Army needs managers too. Look, staff sergeants major along with their primary staff officer, manage resources, equipment, time, and other functions that we typically associate with DOTMLPF. These are the NCOs in the G-staff’s, serving technical roles in ceneters of excellence, and in senior command levels providing administrative advice and effort. These positions differ from those of the senior NCO of the command, the WSM, and as such should wear the rank that designates they are technician and administrators, which is what the Specialist 9 rank was designed for.

The Continental Army that earned our independence was modeled after European armies and the regimental sergeant major is a title of address with a long history and was even used as a position in the U.S. Army until the regimental system was broken up to our current task organization of company-battalion-brigade-division. Those same western Armies also warrant their senior enlisted leaders. Warrant Officer Class 1 (WO1) Paul Carney is the Army Sergeant Major (ASM) and the highest-ranking NCO in the British Army. Kim Felmingham is the 12th Regimental Sergeant Major of the Australian Army (RSM-A) is the most senior warrant officer in the Australian Army and a member of the Chief of Army's personal staff. There are other, and this is not a ludicrous idea here.

Command sergeants major were appointed, not anointed; the rank and title are misleading. I advocate for change, and one that solves a number of burning issues that all senior enlisted leaders know are true. But instead, we suck it and try to make the rank insignia, roles, and titles work. Some define insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Let’s deal with the problems of sergeants major of a command and the technical sergeants major that exist, create a new pathway in order to give senior enlisted leaders authority and responsibility that has been missing since the 1968 implementation decisions. That, and provide a lasting pay incentive for serving the tough jobs and at levels of responsibility commensurate with their expertise. The NCO Corps replaced the Top Three Graders in 1958 yet we still haven’t earned our place as a true profession. These actions could be another step toward that ultimate goal.

CSM (Ret) Daniel K. Elder

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