Soldiers from across the 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii were testing their proficiency in basic infantry and Soldier tasks in 2021 in the hopes of earning the Expert Infantryman Badge or the Expert Soldier Badge. Photo by Spc. Jessica Scott (04.27.2021)
Sergeants do not make decisions, we advise. Beyond the squad leader, the general premise is that every enlisted leader above and below the squad leader, who is typically a staff sergeant (S. Sgt.) pay grade E-6, serves as a member of a support channel of communication and supervision. According to Army demographic data S. Sgts. make up about 16% of the total enlisted inventory population (Department of the Army, 2022), so what in the heck good are the other 120k of enlisted leaders?
Well, according to para. 2-19 in Army Command Policy AR 600-20, "Commanders will define the responsibilities and authority of their NCOs to their staff and subordinates," meanwhile they list 11 functions that NCOs will follow to “assist” the chain of command in accomplishing. The July 20, 2020 edition lists what I can only guess is an error in that NCOs should use DA Pam 611–21 (and the NCO Guide) to understand “responsibilities, command functions, and scope of NCO duties” when it should most likely be DA PAM 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide. But calling for change there is another artcile for another day.
As a citizen historian and cub reporter for almost 30 years I have been studying, reporting on, and sometimes even and scuffing up the U.S. Army NCO corps. I have accepted the fact the enlisted force is subservient to other cohorts because that is the way it has always been done, and we as NCOs just ought to stick to the basics. You know what they call it, “blocking and tackling.” My pals watch my ears turn red when I hear phrases about basic NCOs because they know I will probably repeat what one of my mentors, Sg. Maj. Felix Sanchez asked me one day after being told that phrase. We were working on creating the course material for the first-ever virtual senior and advanced level PME courses and getting pushback from the top that reminded him to stick to the basics. Returning to our cube farm he slammed down his hand and said, “I have been getting back to the basics my whole damn career, what I want to know is when the hell do we start getting to the advance stuff!” Sorry Chez, I think we are heading back to basic training again.
Okay, it’s not too hard to find the basic role of the NCO….we are trainers, mentors, advisors and communicators (Pam 600-25, 2023). Add those to the NCO support channel functions and you see the core foundation of what the heck we are good for. But is that it?!? You mean to tell me that the enlisted leader cohort does not have the capability or capacity to do more than “assist,” “advise,” or to have “shared responsibility?” I mean, has anybody even considered trying to place NCOs in critical decision-making positions and give them the authority and responsibility to operate? And I don’t necessarily mean commanding units, though that is a thought for later. I know why an enlisted commandant does not have court martial convening authority and manage their own UCMJ, it is according to the MCM. But it can change, cant it?
Follow the Money
Also, enlisted leaders don’t have teh power of the purse. We do not have the authority to buy stuff that we and our units need with Army money, either. We don’t manage budgets, we don’t acquire goods, we do not procure equipment or services, except at the Pcard level (and usually only a supply sergeant, with command approval). We don’t approve policy, even if it affects only our cohort and nothing else, it still must be signed off. Every action in every unit requires a commander’s signature, and NCOs dont command squat. It’s the way we do things, it’s the basic fundamentals of how we operate the Army. So, it has been written, and so it will be done. So why do we put up with it that way? Here is what my friend Mark Baker thought about how NCOs expectations are managed.
Hat tip to the creator of Pvt. Murphy’s Law Mark Baker ©1993-1999. Mark was using 1998 pay scale. Today an O-2 with 3 years makes more money than an SFC with 20-years.
The NCO Support Channel blues
The first attempt to codify a channel for NCOs distinct and separate from staff and technical channels began with Change 8 of AR 600-20 in April 1978. The Army went more than 200 years before the roles and responsibilities were described in that way at the department level, and the nine functions listed were mostly similar to what we have now. To me, those are the “basics” considering the capabilities and capacity of today’s noncommissioned officer. In almost 50-years the NCO support channel has not been tinkered with much and I find my mind going back to Chez’s question about when do we as NCOs get to the advance stuff?
At the basic level, we have NCO tank and Bradley commanders, enlisted skippers on Army watercraft, and NCOs piloting and controlling unmanned systems. Enlisted commandants lead our NCO academies, the Drill Sergeant School and we even see company commanders at the NCO Leader Center of Excellence and the Sergeants Major Academy. But each one has had their duties and responsibilities defined by their current existing officer leadership, which is a limitation and restriction that is only applied to the enlisted cohort. The military operates under civilian authority and even Department of Army civilians have authority over and ahead of most enlisted leaders, especially when compared to grade standards table.
From my very first level of ePME I learned about the five sources of power. Though the noncommissioned officer can learn to master the other four (or the least three positive ones), the one that matters most is legitimate power. The annals of Army history are replete with stories of our commissioned officer cohort who have created and ran our Army with nary an NCO be attributed. For hundreds of years the “good NCOs” were commissioned. Meanwhile, our roles have continued to be limited to the basic fundamental tasks because the institution itself has not expanded them. It is easy to look over the fence and covet thy neighbors property, but test my theory by checking Futures Command, Materiel Command, or the Acquisition communities and count the officer to enlisted personnel ratio, especially at the mid level.
We might have a senior NCOs at the top of the pyramid in some of those places, and then (echo) (echo), there is a huge gap in enlisted participation. It’s because we are needed elsewhere performing our "basic" duties…it is what our roles have been defined as. Also, note the different “functional areas” that are available to the officer cohort and see how many either exclude NCOs totally, or we are ratioed instead. Consider population-wise that enlisted ;eaders are the largest cohort in comparison at every grade, ratio-wise, and our benefits and opportunities are way out of proportion. Maybe that is because we are not the decision-makers who draw the personnel authorization charts, or are even a part of the dialog? The problems don't lie in the authorization or assignment, but goes back to the fundamental role of NCOs to understand why we are excluded. Read the book Upstream: : The Quest to Solve Problems Before They Happen (affiliate link) by Dan Heath not only to see how to get to the root of NCO restrictions and limitations, but why modifying it its going to require a culture change.
The next battle ground for equality
In the last 20 years I have seen an increase in better broadening assignments, and more developmental opportunities are now available to NCOs. We now have a Fellows program that allows a small token of the most senior enlisted leaders annually to earn their master’s degree on the Army dime, on Army time. But compare that to the Army Congressional Fellowship Program to which the NCO Fellowship is not even connected. Ratioed again. The pockets of programs, assignments, and duties that are available to every cohort other than enlisted are staggering. Even the Enlisted Aide program is wonky. Check out a Maj. or Lt. Col. serving as an aid to a general officer and watch their duties, as compared to the enlisted aid to that same general officer. You mean we couldn’t replace that major with a master sergeant and allow that same access and mentorship the GO provides the major to the M. Sgt.? Or how about we replace that major who is serving ASA(ALT) as an alternate deputy program manager for some future widget system 2025 with a senior NCO? Who knows, maybe we will get the kind of gear soldiers want and need? NO WAY, get back to the line, sargn’t.
I’m not all gloom and doom, I have hope. Hope because in the last 20-years I have seen so many firsts that my head is spinning as old policies and ways of doing business are being crushed. But one area we are not investigating is the division between the ranks. Gender, race, religion, sexual orientation and so many other social divisions have been on the table for the defense department, but the one social division not being spoken about is the class divide. The word sergeant traces its lineage from Latin as serviens or “serving.” No longer does the medieval customs of serjeanty for which nobles and knights had their trusted servien (servant) apply to the role to the modern enlisted leader, yet this class distinction remains.
Blurred Lines
Today, the point at which lines blur between officer and enlisted cohorts is at the senior NCO ranks where the only discriminator between the two is, or was, education. Promotion competition requires NCOs to chase degrees, and generous ePME opportunities push enlisted KSBs more closer to toward their officer counterparts. And, I hear too much about source of degree for NCOs (who pair school with their day jobs). I have seen a majors from some ROTC grads who only had to focus on schooling (and extracurriculars, if you know what I mean), so lay off. Inventory time. Lets measure all the post MLC E-8’s with ~14 years in the Army to all the post C³ O-3s with ~6 years and see if they are equally qualified to take command at the company level? Forget BCAP, maybe we only need to settled this in the pit.
Just last week I saw some hurrahing in what some believed to be our first enlisted leader on a major political ticket, but that is not so. Commissary Sergeant (and later Bvt Maj.) and twice elected President William McKinley was the first. Meanwhile, glass ceilings are getting broken every day. Just this week Lt. Gen. Kevin Admiral became the 63rd commander, and first African American, of the III Corps and Ft. Cavazos. Women and minority leaders are reaching new hieights, congrats. Meanwhile, NCOs are surrounded by glass, left right, up and down. The Army owes itself a relook of what the future holds for the noncommissioned officer in the changing dynamics of future operational envoironment. In the 1970s and before the big four system were fielded it was believed that because of the complexity of the XM1 tank that each system was going to have to be commanded by a lieutenant because NCOs were not capable enough. We are not that far away from that mindset.
The legacy of Sgt. Bilko, Sgt. Schultz, and Sgt. Maj. Plumly are in the past, today’s enlisted cohort is smarter and savvier than ever. To get upstream, we must fix what’s downstream first, and that is the heart of NCO power and authority. And not only to make change to make change, but to ensure equitable access to professional development and broadening opportunities, while ensuring that they are applied equally at ratios commensurate with populations across the Army as a whole.
It’s time to blow the dust off of the NCO Support Channel rulebook and conduct an independent analysis to determine future roles, responsibilities and functions at each level of the enlisted cohort. Today, the NCO Strategy is nested in the guidance and vision of Army leaders, which is the only way the NCO Support Channel is allowed to operate. It’s because of that changing and ambiguous guidance that the NCO Corps can never quite master its position. No other group in the Army has to operate like this. As soon as NCOs get good at current guidance and it is within our grip, a change of command or change of responsibility causes it all to slip away and we have to start again. And now, we are back to the basics.
Saddle up everybody, coach says we need to get out there and practice our blocking and tackling.
/topsarge